Sarah J. Goodman * | 25.2 | Comment | Citation: Sarah J. Goodman, Comment, Insanity-Plea Bargains: A Constitutionally and Practically Good Idea?, 25 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 447 (2023).

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Think about Andrea Yates’ case. In 2001, Andrea Yates, suffering from postpartum depression, believed that she was possessed by Satan and was causing her children irreparable and eternal damage. Yates drowned her five children in a bathtub, killing them. Yates was initially deemed “sane” at her first trial and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after forty years. However, on appeal, Yates’ conviction was reversed. On retrial, Yates was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and was committed to a mental health hospital, where she has remained ever since. If she had pleaded NGRI through a plea bargain earlier, Andrea Yates would have received mental health treatment sooner, rather than incarceration. A NGRI plea bargain would have saved the government time and money and averted her and her family from years of trauma.

Plea bargaining is ubiquitous in the United States criminal legal system. Ninety-four percent of felony cases and ninety-nine percent of misdemeanor cases end in guilty pleas. Some estimate that seventy-five percent of all guilty pleas are a plea bargain with the government. Mental illness is also prevalent in the United States, affecting over fifty percent of people at some point in their lifetime.

Given the prevalence of mental health issues in America, one may assume that the criminal legal system recognizes and responds to defendants’ mental illnesses. Indeed, the criminal legal system developed two responsive pleas—Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) and Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI). At first glance, these pleas seem beneficial. Defendants who lack the moral or cognitive capacity to behave rationally should not be—and are not—held responsible for their actions. Yet, we rarely observe NGRI / GBMI plea bargains. Why is this the case? Are there statutory or constitutional barriers to such plea bargains? If not, should more defendants enter into them? There has been an abundance of scholarship surrounding both plea bargaining and the insanity defense, but no scholar has fully explored their interaction and what happens when a defendant pleads NGRI / GBMI through a plea bargain. This Comment seeks to bridge this gap. This may be an “empirically unimportant” matter due to the infrequency of the insanity defense. However, it is a philosophically and socially important one. There is an inherent tension with the insanity defense: balancing individual liberty and public safety with the societal belief that individuals with severe mental health conditions deserve treatment. There is no clear answer on how to balance both sides of this tension, and there is an increasing prevalence of both mental illness and plea bargaining in the American criminal justice system. Further, there are concerns that plea bargains disproportionately harm poor and minority defendants. As society demands more equity in the criminal justice system, we should pay attention to the effect on defendants.

This Comment argues that structural and functional limits cause the infrequency of NGRI / GBMI plea bargains. Despite the value of mental health treatment, the possibility of indefinite commitment can deter insane defendants who do not want a permanent loss of liberty. Therefore, reforms to the system must be made before more defendants should enter into these pleas.

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* J.D., Class of 2023, University of Pennsylvania Law School.