Civil RICO Standing for Misleading Pharmaceutical Marketing in Painters Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharmaceutical Co.
Tristan Lim * | 24.6 | Comment | Citation: Tristan Lim, Civil RICO Standing for Misleading Pharmaceutical Marketing in Painters Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., 24 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1401 (2022).
Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires that judicial power extend
only to “cases” and “controversies”—a requirement commonly understood
as standing to sue.1 Article III’s standing requirement embodies a
constitutional minimum that the plaintiff must have suffered a concrete
injury, fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct that a court can redress by
a favorable ruling. Congress may even specify what is required of a potential
plaintiff to satisfy Article III standing under a particular statute. Under the
civil provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(“RICO”), a potential plaintiff must be injured “in his business or property”
“by reason of” certain predicate acts as defined by the statute. Within the
past two decades, there has been a wave of opioid litigation against major
pharmaceutical corporations.4 A current split among circuit courts of
appeals is whether plaintiffs should be able to sue to recover money they
would not have paid to pharmaceutical corporations but-for certain
misrepresentations.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers spend billions of dollars in marketing and
promoting the effectiveness of their drugs to physicians who then prescribe them to patients. But sometimes the promotions are not entirely truthful.
For example, in 2012, GlaxoSmithKline paid approximately three billion
dollars to resolve an allegation by the U.S. Department of Justice that it failed
to report cardiovascular safety risks from taking its diabetes drug Avandia.
The next year Johnson & Johnson paid more than two billion dollars to settle
an investigation by the Department of Justice into whether the company
inappropriately marketed its antipsychotic drug Risperdal to be safe and
effective for the elderly and children with mental disabilities. But can parties
other than the Department of Justice sue pharmaceutical manufacturers for
those misleading or untruthful statements? In 2019, the Ninth Circuit
confronted this question and answered yes.
In Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda
Pharmaceutical Co., the Ninth Circuit allowed health insurance providers to
proceed with their claims against Takeda Pharmaceuticals under the RICO
statute, alleging they would not have paid for Takeda’s drug but-for the
company’s misrepresentations about the drug’s effectiveness. However, the
Ninth Circuit was not the first circuit to allow such a claim. Other circuits,
confronted with the same question and similar plaintiffs, did not allow the
claim to proceed. This Comment will explore the circuit split of whether
misrepresentations about a drug’s safety suffice to grant standing under the
RICO statute. This Comment argues that plaintiffs should have standing to
pursue their claims because their harm was foreseeable and the natural
consequence of misrepresenting a drug’s safety risks.
This Comment proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses the drug approval
process by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the practice of offlabel
prescribing, and the benefits of seeking FDA approval for a drug. Part
II examines the history of the RICO statute, its text, and how the Supreme
Court has broadly interpreted the statute’s scope. Part III documents the
Supreme Court’s standing analysis for a civil RICO claim and the current
circuit split. Part IV discusses the practice of direct-to-physician marketing
and argues why courts should be willing to find civil RICO standing for
pharmaceutical misrepresentation cases. Part V proposes benefits to public health by allowing these claims to proceed. Part VI briefly concludes about
the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Painters and the state of the
civil RICO statute moving forward.
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* J.D., 2022, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2018, University of California, Irvine.